YLBHI Press Release for the 81st Anniversary of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI): The Republic in the Grip of Camouflage—The Expansion of the Military’s Role and the Betrayal of Reform

THE REPUBLIC IN THE GRIP OF THE MILITARY: 

The Expansion of the Military’s Role and the Abandonment of Reform Jakarta, October 5, 2026 – A grand ceremony was held in East Jakarta to mark the 81st anniversary of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), themed “A Strong TNI Together with the People, for a Sovereign, Just, and Prosperous Indonesia.” 

On this occasion, LBH–YLBHI wishes to remind the State once again that the TNI must operate strictly within its constitutional mandate. The TNI must be professional, respect and uphold civilian supremacy, and safeguard human rights. 

 The 1998 Reform brought about a fundamental correction to the military’s role in the life of the nation. Article 30, paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution defines the TNI as an instrument of the State in the realm of defense. People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) Decree No. VI/MPR/2000 separated the TNI from the National Police, while MPR Decree No. VII/MPR/2000 declared that the socio-political role inherent in the *dwifungsi* (dual-function) doctrine of the former ABRI (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) had led to a distortion of the TNI’s purpose and hindered the development of democratic foundations. 

The 1998 Reform was built upon a lesson learned at a high cost: that arms must be subordinate to the law, and the law must be subordinate to the will of the citizenry. 

That lesson is now being slowly erased. Between October 1, 2025, and September 30, 2026, LBH–YLBHI documented 58 cases involving violence, the restriction of civil liberties, and the dispossession of living spaces. Furthermore, it has identified at least 192 “Territorial Development Battalions” (*Batalion Teritorial Pembangunan*) spread across 164 regencies and cities. 

The military is now present in rice fields, in the kitchens of the "Free Nutritious Meals" program, in village cooperatives, and in courtrooms where its own personnel are tried. Today, YLBHI releases the findings of our monitoring conducted over the past year. 

This report, titled "A Republic in the Grip of Camouflage: The Expansion of the Military’s Role and the Abandonment of Reform," was produced as part of civil society’s push for the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and the state to improve themselves and adhere to the constitutional mandate.

YLBHI notes that the expansion of the Indonesian National Armed Forces’ (TNI) role during this monitoring period rests on three mutually reinforcing pillars: 1) territorial infrastructure; 2) human resources; and 3) funding from multiple sources. New units provide personnel and facilities in the regions; civil-sector assignments grant these units tasks and access; and budgetary allocations enable both to function. All three were established without any publicly disclosed assessment of defense needs and without a formal political decision made by the state in conjunction with the House of Representatives (DPR RI). Once established, these pillars create fiscal obligations and institutional interests that are difficult to reverse.

Funding for this expansion does not flow solely through the Ministry of Defense (Kemhan); furthermore, the actual amounts involved deviate significantly from those stipulated in the State Budget (APBN) Law. While the defense budget in the 2025 State Budget was set at IDR 166.05 trillion, the actual expenditure for the defense function reached IDR 348.58 trillion—more than double the initial figure. This "multi-channel" funding pattern poses serious challenges for oversight. Funds allocated to various ministries, government agencies, and local governments are not categorized as "defense spending," thereby bypassing the scrutiny designed for military expenditures.

Regarding the Ministry of Defense’s own funding, the share of procurement allocated through open tenders has dropped from 41% in 2022 to 10.4% in 2025, while direct appointments and "exempted" procurement methods now account for 55.2% of the 2025 budget ceiling. Notably, 148 "design-build" construction projects were awarded through direct appointment.

These pillars illustrate what can be described as "political accumulation"—the consolidation of budgetary control, official positions, and territorial networks—which strengthens the military’s bargaining power in determining development priorities. Political capacity translates into economic access when military territorial units are positioned alongside mining concessions—with unit-affiliated cooperatives securing procurement contracts worth IDR 100–300 billion annually—and when cooperatives under the auspices of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) provide security services to foreign companies. 

The occupation of civilian posts by active-duty and retired officers also creates opportunities for corruption, as evidenced by the case involving the National Nutrition Agency (Badan Gizi Nasional). Furthermore, these practices contravene the prohibition against military personnel engaging in business, as stipulated in Article 39 of Law No. 34 of 2004.

YLBHI assesses that the expansion of the Indonesian National Armed Forces’ (TNI) role has placed this armed institution in a precarious position regarding the governance of land and natural resources. The TNI can now simultaneously act as an enforcer of regional regulations, a land user, a partner in managing seized assets, and an entity possessing coercive capacity. This concentration of roles creates a structural conflict of interest. Citizens defending their land find themselves confronting authorities who are, at the same time, the very ones determining the status of, securing, and utilizing the disputed property. This concentration is established through three channels: legal and administrative frameworks, territorial expansion, and coercive operations.

YLBHI views the "militarization of governance" as a phenomenon occurring when civilian affairs are increasingly subjected to intervention by—and become ever more dependent upon—armed organizations for their planning, execution, and financing. This process does not require a coup d'état or the formal reactivation of the military’s "dual function" (*dwifungsi*). 

Instead, it unfolds through the decisions of civilian officials themselves—via presidential regulations, presidential instructions, ministerial circulars, memoranda of understanding, and the allocation of regional budgets. Consequently, this militarization of governance must be evaluated against the principle of civilian supremacy, which serves as a core mandate of the *Reformasi* (reform) era.

In light of this, YLBHI draws four critical conclusions. First, the military’s expansion into the civilian sphere is massive, deliberate, and opaque. Second, the accompanying human rights violations are structural in nature. Third, impunity has been institutionalized, effectively shielding the chain of command. Fourth, the rule of law and the principle of civilian supremacy are being hollowed out from within.

Responsibility for this situation lies with the President—as the supreme authority over the TNI—the House of Representatives (DPR RI) for failing to exercise its oversight functions, and the various ministers and regional heads who have ceded civilian affairs to the military. YLBHI warns that, absent immediate corrective action, Indonesia is drifting toward a state governed by the logic of command—a system where armed power can no longer be constrained by law or by the people. Jakarta, October 5, 2026

YLBHI Board