The Legislative Shadows

 The Legislative Shadows In mid-September, Rifqinizamy Karsayuda, Chairman of the House of Representatives (DPR) Commission II, described himself and his colleagues as "soldiers assigned by the party chairpersons." 

The following day, he stated that agreements reached among party chairpersons would serve as the "primary baseline" for drafting the Election Bill. Rifqinizamy also pledged to take into account Constitutional Court (MK) rulings and public aspirations. 

The issue, however, is this: to what extent will Constitutional Court rulings and the people's aspirations actually be heeded—and capable of altering decisions—if agreements among party chairpersons remain the guiding principle?

The question remains: to what extent are Constitutional Court rulings and the aspirations of the people actually heeded—and capable of altering decisions—when the agreements reached by party chairpersons serve as the primary guiding force? 

Agus Riwanto has warned of the dangers of elite dominance when election participants draft their own rules of the game (Kompas, September 28, 2026). 

Unfortunately, this issue is widespread and has become a recurring pattern in legislative practice. Control over parliament enables elites to determine whose interests are prioritized and whose objections are sidelined. 

Bivitri Susanti has warned of the dangers of "autocratic legalism"—a situation where laws are enacted to legitimize undemocratic actions (Kompas, January 5, 2023). 

Citing scholars such as Kim Lane Scheppele, she explains how the weakening of oversight institutions allows those in power to transgress constitutional boundaries and weaponize legal mechanisms for their own interests.

This framework helps us examine the direction of legal change: does it strengthen citizens' ability to oversee power, or does it curtail that ability? The tyranny of legislation arises when the authority to regulate collective life is used to perpetuate the interests of those in power. Political consensus can certainly be part of the legislative process; however, if decisions are locked in before the voice of the people and expert analyses are considered, the drafting and deliberation stages become merely a means to legitimize a choice already made. Meetings take place, opinions are solicited, and approvals are voiced, yet this amounts to nothing more than token participation. This situation is inextricably linked to the existence of a massive government coalition that also dominates the House of Representatives (DPR). Consequently, one can hardly expect the House to fulfill its mandate of oversight and checks and balances. Kuskridho Ambardhy (2009) termed this phenomenon the "cartelization of political parties"—the formation of bloated coalitions that reduce the parliament to a mere rubber stamp. The government and the parliamentary majority reinforce one another’s policy choices, while objections from outside this circle are dismissed as inconsequential. The mandate derived from the people's voice shrinks into a matter of House members simply deferring to their party leaders. The experience with the Job Creation Law (MBG) illustrates how the House failed to serve as a vehicle for serious evaluation.