From the Fifth Plenary Session of the CCP: Xi Jinping Reportedly Wishes to Step Down

 The Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), which concluded on October 29, 2026, has left behind more questions than answers. Beyond the official decisions to strengthen party discipline and reaffirm the leadership of Xi Jinping, speculation has emerged regarding a potential shift in power at the pinnacle of the Chinese government.

Claims have even circulated suggesting that, during the session, Xi Jinping offered his resignation—twice—from his positions as General Secretary of the CPC and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), citing health reasons. However, this information originates from anonymous sources cited by political commentator Tang Jingyuan and has not been corroborated by any official announcements or independent sources.

What makes this speculation particularly noteworthy are several anomalies within the official communiqué, an attendance rate among Central Committee members that reached its lowest point since the post-Mao era, and the decision to expel 33 officials from the party.

A report by *Vision Times* on November 1, 2026, cited three Chinese-language political commentators—Wen Zhao, Tang Jingyuan, and Jiang Feng—who offered varying interpretations of these developments. While they all perceive serious upheaval within the CPC elite, they differ on whether Xi remains in full control of power or is beginning to face pressure from within his own inner circle.

Lowest Attendance; 33 Officials Expelled from the Party

One of the most striking aspects of the Fifth Plenary Session was the low number of Central Committee members in attendance. The official communiqué stated that out of the 205 full members and 171 alternate members of the Central Committee—elected during the 20th CPC National Congress in 2022—only 162 full members and 117 alternate members were present.

Consequently, the total attendance stood at 279 out of 376 members, representing approximately 74.2 percent. A total of 97 individuals were not recorded as attending the meeting. Reuters described this 25.8 percent absence rate as the highest in the post-Mao era. This situation highlights the significant shift in the composition of the party elite following a wave of investigations and the removal of officials in recent years.

During the session, the Central Committee approved disciplinary actions against 34 officials. Thirty-three individuals were expelled from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—comprising 24 full members of the Central Committee and nine alternate members—while Li Yunze, former head of the National Financial Regulatory Administration, was removed from his party position.

Among the 24 expelled Central Committee members, 15 are from the military. These include Zhang Youxia, former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and Liu Zhenli, former chief of the CMC’s Joint Staff Department.

Other notable figures removed include Zhong Shaojun, former director of the CMC General Office—long considered a close associate of Xi Jinping—as well as Liu Jianchao, former head of the CCP’s International Department.

The purge of Zhong Shaojun is particularly significant, given his long-standing status as a member of Xi’s inner circle. The removal of officials who once held close ties to the top leader suggests that the disciplinary campaign extends beyond political rivals to include individuals previously embedded within his own power structure.

Wen Zhao observes that this situation indicates the party’s internal turmoil is far from over. He also notes that of the 24 vacant Central Committee seats, only 10 alternate members were promoted to fill them, leaving 14 seats still unoccupied.

According to him, this incompleteness serves as an indicator that the reshuffling of personnel within the CCP is still ongoing.

Six Anomalies in the Communiqué: Is Xi’s Position Beginning to Weaken?

Attention has also turned to the content of the Fifth Plenary Session’s communiqué. Tang Jingyuan has identified six changes that he considers unusual when compared to the communiqués of previous plenary sessions.

First, several political expressions that specifically affirmed Xi Jinping’s position as the core of the leadership no longer appear in the same pattern.

Second, calls urging the entire military and the people—across various ethnic groups—to unite in a single rank are also absent.

Third, the term "democratic centralism" is given greater emphasis. According to Tang, the term appears five times across three sections of the communiqué—a frequency he considers unusual compared to documents from previous plenary sessions.

Fourth, the oversight of how top leaders carry out their duties and exercise their power is explicitly mentioned. Fifth, the Party Constitution is reaffirmed as the fundamental guideline for all members. Sixth, certain phrases previously associated with Xi’s ideology on strengthening the military, as well as the responsibility system of the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, no longer appear in the same manner.

Tang interprets these changes as a possible sign of pressure on Xi from other elite groups. In his view, shifts in the political language used in official documents may indicate a change in the balance of power.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the official communiqué still refers to Xi as the General Secretary of the Central Committee, mentions that he delivered an important speech, and calls on all Party members to rally around the Central Committee with Xi at its core. Therefore, the omission of certain phrases is not sufficient evidence that Xi has lost his legitimacy or political power.

More intriguing is the newfound emphasis on the oversight of top-ranking officials. In Tang’s interpretation, this shift could be seen as an attempt to curb the concentration of power that has characterized Xi’s leadership. However, there is no independent evidence to suggest that these changes in the communiqué’s language are the result of a factional agreement specifically aimed at diminishing Xi’s power.

Rumors of Xi Proposing Resignation Twice

The most striking speculation comes from Tang Jingyuan, who cites an anonymous source allegedly having access to the inner circles of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

According to this information, Xi Jinping reportedly offered to resign from his positions as General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission on the third and fourth days of the plenary session, citing health reasons.

However, the proposal was allegedly rejected because no consensus had been reached on who would assume military leadership or what the composition of the next Central Military Commission would look like.

Tang himself cautions that this information should be treated with care. He notes that the source might belong to a faction seeking political change, meaning the information provided may not necessarily reflect the full situation.

He also questions why no succession plan was prepared in advance if Xi’s resignation was indeed a primary agenda item. Furthermore, Hu Chunhua—often mentioned as a potential figure in a leadership transition—has not returned to the Politburo.

Tang concludes that if there was indeed pressure on Xi, the faction seeking change has not yet managed to resolve the complexities of the succession.

Jiang Feng offers a more dramatic version, claiming that Xi’s resignation—ostensibly for health reasons—was the result of pressure from senior party leaders. According to his interpretation, Xi’s name remains in the official communiqué to maintain the appearance of leadership continuity, while, in reality, some authority has shifted to other groups behind the scenes.

However, Jiang’s claims remain unconfirmed by independent sources. Official records, in fact, show that Xi is still identified as General Secretary in the October 29 communiqué; he led the presentation of the Politburo’s work report and provided explanations regarding the draft decisions of the plenary session. There has been no official announcement regarding his resignation.

Thus, while the rumors of Xi’s resignation represent one of the most intriguing speculations to emerge from this session, they cannot yet be treated as fact. The Military Faces Internal Divisions

An equally significant issue concerns the situation within the Chinese military. The purge of 15 military members from the Central Committee highlights the substantial impact of the disciplinary campaign on the command structure. It is also reported that five of the seven members of the Central Military Commission (CMC) appointed in 2022 have been removed.

The plenary session elevated Zhang Shengmin to the Politburo. He previously served as a deputy chairman of the CMC and has a background in military disciplinary oversight.

Jiang Feng interprets these developments as an indication of tensions between various factions within the military, particularly between elements of the Army and the Air Force.

He even claims that a kind of "cold schism" has emerged within the military. According to his analysis, several Army officials disagree with the manner in which the Central Military Commission (CMC) leadership has been appointed and reorganized following the ousting of senior generals.

Jiang also mentions Li Zuocheng as a figure rumored to have been considered for the position of acting vice-chairman of the CMC. However, all information regarding this conflict remains based on interpretations and anonymous sources, rather than verifiable official reports.

Meanwhile, Wen Zhao offers a different perspective. He views the purges as part of Xi’s ongoing strategy to consolidate control over the military and the entire party apparatus.

These differing viewpoints suggest that the large number of officials removed does not necessarily prove the existence of a rebellion or a breakdown in the chain of command. Nevertheless, the scale of this personnel turnover remains a serious issue for the continuity of China’s military leadership.

The 2027 Congress: A Decisive Moment for Xi’s Future

The Fifth Plenary Session also established that the 21st National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will be held in Beijing in the second half of 2027. This congress will serve as a critical juncture for determining the party’s leadership lineup for the subsequent five years. Consequently, political developments over the coming months will be pivotal in shaping the trajectory of Xi Jinping’s power.

The outcomes of this session reveal two concurrent realities. On one hand, the official communiqué reaffirms Xi as the core of the party’s leadership. On the other, a wave of purges—affecting dozens of elites, including former close associates of Xi—underscores significant instability within the organizational structure.

Wen Zhao anticipates that the disciplinary campaign will continue. He even draws a parallel between the current political climate and the situation leading up to the Great Purge in the Soviet Union in 1937. This comparison is his own political interpretation, not a definitive claim that China is repeating Soviet history.

For Xi, the challenge lies not merely in retaining his position, but in ensuring that government officials, the military, and the party apparatus remain consistently aligned with his command.

If the rumors of his resignation prove false, Xi must still demonstrate that this wave of purges serves as a tool for consolidation rather than a new source of instability. Conversely, if there is indeed internal pressure constraining his authority, the 2027 Congress could potentially become the stage for a far more complex reconfiguration of leadership.

The Fifth Plenary Session does not mark the end of the Xi Jinping era. Yet, for the first time in recent years, global attention is focused not just on whom Xi has sidelined, but on a more fundamental question: does Xi himself still maintain full control over the power he has spent years building? (Sang Fajar)